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Abstract. We prove that optimal strategies exist in perfect-information stochastic games
with finitely many states and actions and tail winning conditions.
Introduction
We prove that optimal strategies exist in perfect-information stochastic games with finitely
many states and actions and tail winning conditions.
This proof is different from the algorithmic proof sketched in [Hor08].
1. Perfect-Information Stochastic Games
In this section we give formal definitions of perfect-information stochastic games, values
and optimal strategies.
1.1. Games, plays and strategies. A (perfect-information stochastic) game is a tuple
(V, VMax, Vmin, VR, E,W, p), where (V,E) is a finite graph, (VMax, Vmin, VR) is a partition
of V , W ⊆ V ω is a measurable set called the winning condition and for every v ∈ VR
and w ∈ V , p(w|v) ≥ 0 is the transition probability from v to w, with the property∑
w∈V p(w|v) = 1.
A play is an infinite sequence v0v1 · · · ∈ V
ω of vertices such that if vn ∈ (VMax ∪ Vmin)
then (vn, vn+1) ∈ E and if vn ∈ VR then p(vn+1|vn) > 0. A play is won by Max if it belongs
to W otherwise the play is won by Min. A finite play is a finite prefix of a play.
A strategy for player Max is a mapping σ : V ∗VMax → V such that for each finite play
h = v0 . . . vn such that vn ∈ VMax, we have (vn, σ(h)) ∈ E. A play v0v1 · · · is consistent
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with σ if for every n, if vn ∈ VMax then vn+1 is σ(v0 · · · vn). A strategy for player Min is
defined similarly, and is generally denoted τ .
Once the initial vertex v and two strategies σ, τ for player Max and Min are fixed, we can
measure the probability that a given set of plays occurs. This probability measure is denoted
P
σ,τ
v . For every n ∈ N, we denote by Vn the random variable defined by Vn(v0v1 · · · ) = vn,
the set of plays is equipped with the σ-algebra generated by random variables (Vn)n∈N.
Then there exists a probability measure Pσ,τv with the following properties:
P
σ,τ
v (V0 = v) = 1 (1.1)
P
σ,τ
v (Vn+1 = σ(V0 · · · Vn) | Vn ∈ VMax) = 1 , (1.2)
P
σ,τ
v (Vn+1 = τ(V0 · · ·Vn) | Vn ∈ Vmin) = 1 , (1.3)
P
σ,τ
v (Vn+1 | Vn ∈ VR) = p(Vn+1|Vn) . (1.4)
Expectation of a real-valued, measurable and bounded function φ under Pσ,τv is denoted
E
σ,τ
v [φ]. For an event W ⊆ V ω, we denote 1W the indicator function of W . We will often
use implicitely the following formula, which gives the expectation of φ once a finite prefix
h = v0v1 · · · vn of the play is fixed:
E
σ,τ
v [ φ | V0 · · ·Vn = h] = E
σ[h],τ [h]
vn
[ φ[h] ] , (1.5)
where σ[h](w0w1w2 · · · ) = σ(v0 · · · vnw1w2 · · · ) and τ [h] and φ[h] are defined similarly.
1.2. Values. The goal of player Max is to satisfy the winning condition with the highest
probability possible, whereas player Min has the opposite goal. Given a starting vertex v
and a strategy σ for player Max, whatever strategy τ is chosen by Min, the play will be
won with probability at least:
inf
τ
P
σ,τ
v (W ) .
Thus, starting from v, player Max can ensure winning the game with probability arbitrarily
close to:
val∗(v) = sup
σ
inf
τ
P
σ,τ
v (W ) ,
and symmetrically, player Min can ensure the play is not won with probability much higher
than:
val∗(v) = inf
τ
sup
σ
P
σ,τ
v (W ) .
Clearly val∗(v) ≤ val
∗(v). According to Martin’s theorem [Mar98] these values are equal,
and this common value is called the value of vertex v and denoted val(v)
1.3. Optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies. By definition of the value, for each ǫ > 0 there
exist ǫ-optimal strategies σǫ for player Max and τǫ for player Min such that for every vertex
v,
inf
τ
P
σǫ,τ
v (W ) ≥ val(v)− ǫ ,
and symmetrically for player 2,
sup
σ
P
σ,τǫ
v (W ) ≤ val(v) + ǫ .
For several classes of winning conditions, it is known that there exists optimal strategies,
i.e. strategies that are ǫ-optimal for every ǫ.
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In this paper, we prove that optimal strategies exist in games whose winning condition
has the following property.
Definition 1.1. A winning condition W ⊆ V ω is a tail winning condition if for every finite
play p ∈ V ∗ and infinite play q ∈ V ω,
(q ∈W ) ⇐⇒ (pq ∈W ) .
Games with tail winning conditions have the following properties.
Lemma 1.2. Let G be a game with a tail winning condition W . Then for every vertex
v ∈ V , 

val(v) = max(v,w)∈E val(w) if v ∈ VMax ,
val(v) = min(v,w)∈E val(w) if v ∈ Vmin ,
val(v) =
∑
(v,w)∈E p(w|v) val(w) if v ∈ VR .
Proof. This comes from (1.5), and the fact that 1W [h] = 1W , because W is a tail winning
condition.
2. Optimal strategies in games with tail winning conditions
Our main result is:
Theorem 2.1. In every perfect-information stochastic game with tail winning condition
and finitely many states and actions, both players have optimal strategies.
The proof of this theorem relies on several intermediary results.
2.1. Consistent games. Next lemma states that it is enough to prove Theorem 2.1 in the
case where no move of player Max can decrease the value of a vertex and no move of player
Min can increase the value of a vertex.
Lemma 2.2. Let G be a game with a tail winning condition W . We say an edge (v,w)
is superfluous when either v ∈ VMax and valG(w) < valG(v) or v ∈ Vmin and valG(w) >
valG(v). Let G
′ the game obtained from G by removing all superfluous edges. If there are
optimal strategies in G′ then there are optimal strategies in G as well.
Proof. We prove that there exists optimal strategies in the game G′ obtained by removing
only one of the superfluous edges, Lemma 2.2 then results from a trivial induction.
Let (vs, ws) be the superfluous edge removed. Without loss of generality, suppose
vs ∈ VMax, and let
m = valG(vs)− valG(ws) > 0 .
Suppose there exists optimal strategies σ′, τ ′ in G′.
In game G, player Max has more freedom than in game G′, and from every vertex v
player Max can guarantee the probability to win to be at least valG′(v), for that player Max
can use its strategy σ′ for G′, which is a strategy in G as well.
We are going to show that this is the best that player Max can expect in G: we are
going to build a strategy τ that prevents the probability to win to be greater than valG′ . As
a consequence, σ′ and τ are a couple of optimal strategies in G, which proves the lemma.
The strategy τ is as follows. As long as player Max does not choose the superfluous
edge (vs, ws), the play is a play in G
′ and strategy τ consists in playing like the strategy τ ′
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in G′. If at some moment player Max chooses the superfluous edge (vs, ws) then strategy
τ forgets the prefix of the play and switches definitively to a m2 -optimal strategy τm2 in G.
If subsequently player Max chooses the superfluous edge again, nothing special happens, τ
keeps playing accordingly to τ ′. Let Superf be the event defined by:
Superf = {∃n ∈ N, (Vn, Vn+1) = (vs, ws)} ,
then the definition of τ and m ensures that for any strategy σ and vertex v,
P
σ,τ
v (W | Superf) ≤ valG(ws) +
m
2
= valG(vs)−
m
2
. (2.1)
That way we have an upper bound on the probability to win when the plays does go
through the superfluous edge. In case the play does not go through the superfluous edge,
we prove:
P
σ,τ
vs
(W | ¬ Superf) ≤ valG′(vs) . (2.2)
For this, we use the following transformation of σ into a strategy σs in G
′. Strategy σs
plays similarly to σ as long as strategy σ does not plays the superfluous edge (vs, ws). If
after a finite play v0, . . . , vn, with vn = vs, strategy σ is about to choose the superfluous
edge (vs, ws), then σs stops playing similarly to σ. Instead, strategy σs forgets the past
and switches definitively to the strategy σ′ optimal in G′, in other words for every play p,
σs(v0 · · · vnp) = σ
′(p). We denote Switchσ the event:
Switchσ = {∃n ∈ N, Vn = vs and σ(V0, . . . , Vn) = ws} .
Then by definition of σs, for every strategy σ and vertex v,
P
σs,τ
v (W | ¬ Switchσ) = P
σ,τ
v (W | ¬ Superf) (2.3)
P
σs,τ
v (W | Switchσ) ≥ valG′(vs) . (2.4)
Since σs is a strategy in G
′ then Pσs,τv (W ) = P
σs,τ
′
v (W ) ≤ val(G′)(vs) because τ
′ is optimal
inG′. Since Pσs,τv (W ) is a convex combination of P
σs,τ
v (W | ¬ Switchσ) and P
σs,τ
v (W | Switchσ)
then according to (2.4) it implies that Pσs,τv (W | ¬ Switchσ) ≤ valG′(vs). Together with (2.3)
it proves (2.2).
We can now prove that the value of vs in G and G
′ are the same:
valG(vs) = valG′(vs) . (2.5)
Indeed, for every strategy σ, Pσs,τv (W ) is a convex combination of P
σs,τ
v (W | Superf) and
P
σs,τ
v (W | ¬ Superf) hence according to (2.1) and (2.2), P
σs,τ
v (W ) ≤ max{valG vs−
m
2 , valG′(vs)}.
Taking the supremum over σ, since m > 0 it proves (2.5).
To conclude we prove that (2.5) holds not only for vs but for any vertex v. Let v be a
vertex, σ be a strategy and σs the associated switch strategy. Then, since σ and σs coincide
when event Superf does not occur,
P
σ,τ
v (W ) = P
σ,τ
v (W ∧ ¬ Superf) + P
σ,τ
v (W | Superf) · P
σ,τ
v (Superf)
= Pσs,τv (W ∧ ¬ Superf) + P
σ,τ
v (W | Superf) · P
σs,τ
v (Superf) . (2.6)
According to (2.1), Pσ,τv (W | Superf) ≤ valG(vs) = valG′(vs) according to (2.5). By defi-
nition of τ and σs, P
σs,τ
v (W | Superf) = valG′(vs) because when the event Superf occurs
the play is consistent with optimal strategies σ′ and τ ′ in G′. Finally, Pσ,τv (W | Superf) ≤
P
σs,τ
v (W | Superf), which together with (2.6) gives P
σ,τ
v (W ) ≤ P
σs,τ
v (W ). Since σs is a
strategy in G′ and τ is optimal in G′, Pσs,τv (W ) ≤ valG′(v). Taking the supremum over σ,
we get valG(v) ≤ valG′(v) which achieves the proof.
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We say that a game G is consistent when for every edge (v,w), if v ∈ VMax ∪ Vmin then
valG(v) = valG(w). consistent games have the following properties.
Lemma 2.3. Let G be a consistent game with a tail winning condition W . Then for every
initial vertex v0 and strategies σ, τ , and every n ∈ N,
E
σ,τ
v0
[val(Vn+1) | V0, . . . , Vn] = val(Vn) .
Proof. Comes from Lemma 1.2 and the fact that the game is consistent.
2.2. Deviations. To detect bad behaviours of a strategy, we use the notions of quality and
deviations.
The quality of a strategy σ after a finite play is
hσ(v0, . . . , vn) = inf
τ
P
σ,τ
v (W | V0 = v0, . . . , Vn = vn) .
A deviation occurs when the quality of the strategy drops significantly below the value
of the current vertex. Formally, let
m = min
v∈V
{val(v), val(v) > 0} ,
be the smallest strictly positive value1 of a vertex in G, the deviation date is denoted devσ
and defined by:
devσ = min
{
n | hσ(V0, . . . , Vn) ≤ val(Vn)−
m
2
}
,
with the convention min ∅ =∞.
Next lemma states that when player Max plays ǫ-optimally, with ǫ small enough, devi-
ations occur with probability strictly less than 1.
Lemma 2.4. Let G be a consistent game with a tail winning condition W . Let ǫ > 0 and
σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy. For every vertex v and strategy τ ,
P
σ,τ
v0
(devσ <∞) ≤
1 + ǫ
1 + m2
. (2.7)
Proof. We start the proof with a modification of τ and introduce an auxiliary strategy τ ′.
with the following properties:
P
σ,τ ′
v0
(devσ <∞) = P
σ,τ
v0
(devσ <∞) . (2.8)
Let ǫ′ > 0. Strategy τ ′ plays like strategy τ as long as there is no deviation i.e. as long as
hσ(v0, . . . , vn) > val(vn) −
m
2 . In case a deviation occurs i.e. hσ(v0, . . . , vn) ≤ val(vn) −
m
2
then strategy τ ′ forgets the past and switches definitively to an ǫ′-optimal response to
σ[v0, . . . , vn], so that
P
σ,τ ′
v0
(W | devσ = n and V0 · · ·Vn = v0 · · · vn) ≤ val(vn)−
m
2
+ ǫ′ . (2.9)
The equality (2.8) holds because τ and τ ′ coincide as long as there is no deviation.
We start with proving:
E
σ,τ ′
v0
[val (Vdevσ) · 1devσ<∞] ≤ val(v0) . (2.10)
1if ∀v ∈ V, val(v) = 0 then m = ∞ however this case has no interest.
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For every n ∈ N let dev
(n)
σ = min{n,devσ}. According to Lemma 2.3, E
σ,τ ′
v0
[
val
(
V
dev
(n)
σ
)]
=
val(v0) hence E
σ,τ ′
v0
[
val
(
V
dev
(n)
σ
)
· 1devσ<n
]
≤ val(v0). Taking the limit of the left hand-side
of this inequality when n→∞, we obtain (2.10).
The main step of the proof is to establish:
P
σ,τ ′
v0
(W ∧ devσ <∞) ≤ val(v0)−
m
2
· Pσ,τ
′
v0
(devσ <∞) . (2.11)
Then,
P
σ,τ ′
v0
(W ∧ devσ <∞) = E
σ,τ ′
v0
[1W · 1devσ<∞]
= Eσ,τ
′
v0
[
E
σ,τ ′
v0
[1W · 1devσ<∞ | devσ, V0, . . . , Vdevσ ]
]
= Eσ,τ
′
v0
[
E
σ,τ ′
v0
[1W | devσ, V0, . . . , Vdevσ ] · 1devσ<∞
]
≤ Eσ,τ
′
v0
[(
val(Vdevσ)−
m
2
+ ǫ′
)
· 1devσ<∞
]
= Eσ,τ
′
v0
[val(Vdevσ) · 1devσ<∞] +
(
−
m
2
+ ǫ′
)
· Pσ,τ
′
v0
(devσ <∞)
≤ val(v0) +
(
−
m
2
+ ǫ′
)
· Pσ,τ
′
v0
(devσ <∞) ,
where the three first equalities are properties of conditional expectations, the first inequality
is (2.9) and the second inequality is (2.10). Since this holds for every ǫ′, we obtain (2.11)
as promised.
Now we can conclude. Since σ is ǫ-optimal,
val(v0)− ǫ ≤ P
σ,τ ′
v0
(W ) = Pσ,τ
′
v0
(W ∧ devσ <∞) + P
σ,τ ′
v0
(W ∧ devσ =∞)
≤ Pσ,τ
′
v0
(W ∧ devσ <∞) + 1− P
σ,τ ′
v0
(devσ <∞) . (2.12)
Together with (2.11) we obtain (2.7) with τ ′ instead of τ and according to (2.8) this com-
pletes the proof of the lemma.
2.3. Construction of an optimal strategy. We can now proceed with the second and
last step in the proof of Theorem 2.1. From an ǫ-optimal strategy σ, with ǫ small enough,
we construct an optimal strategy, by resetting the memory of σ at right moments. A similar
construction has been used in [Cha06] for proving a zero–one law in concurrent games with
tail winning conditions.
Lemma 2.5. Let G be a consistent game with a tail winning condition W . Then player
Max has an optimal strategy in G.
Proof. If all vertices in G have value 0, there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise, let m be the smallest strictly positive value of a vertex and σ be an m4 -
optimal strategy. Using σ, we are going to define a strategy σ′ and prove that σ′ is optimal
in G. For that, we define t(v0, . . . , vn) the date of the latest deviation before date n by
t(v0) = 0 and
t(v0, . . . , vn, vn+1) =
{
t(v0, . . . , vn) if hσ(vt(v0 ,...,vn), . . . , vn+1) ≥ val(vn+1)−
m
2 ,
n+ 1 otherwise.
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By definition the sequence (t(V0, . . . , Vn))n∈N is increasing, we denote T its limit in N∪{∞}.
Strategy σ′ consists in forgetting everything before the last deviation and applying σ, i.e.
σ′(v0, . . . , vn) = σ(vt(v0 ,...,vn), . . . , vn) .
To prove that σ′ is optimal, we start with proving for every strategy τ and vertex v,
P
σ′,τ
v (T <∞) = 1 . (2.13)
Let D = min{n | t(V0, . . . , Vn) ≥ 1} be the date of the first deviation, then since σ and σ
′
coincide until the first deviation,
P
σ′,τ
v (D <∞) = P
σ,τ
v (D <∞) , (2.14)
and by definition of σ′ for every n ∈ N,
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞ | D = n, V0 = v0, . . . , Vn = vn) = P
σ′,τ [v0,...,vn]
vn
(T =∞) . (2.15)
Let ǫ > 0 and τ and v such that:
sup
τ ′,v′
P
σ′,τ ′
v′
(T =∞) ≤ Pσ
′,τ
v (T =∞) + ǫ . (2.16)
According to lemma 2.4, since σ is m4 -optimal,
P
σ,τ
v (D <∞) ≤
1 + m4
1 + m2
< 1 . (2.17)
By properties of conditional expectations,
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞) = E
σ′,τ
v
[
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞ | D,V0, . . . , VD)
]
= Eσ
′,τ
v
[
1D<∞ · P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞ | D,V0, . . . , VD)
]
= Eσ
′,τ
v
[
1D<∞ · P
σ′,τ [V0,...,VD]
VD
(T =∞)
]
≤ Eσ
′,τ
v
[
1D<∞ ·
(
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞) + ǫ
)]
= Pσ
′,τ
v (D <∞) ·
(
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞) + ǫ
)
=
1 + m4
1 + m2
·
(
P
σ′,τ
v (T =∞) + ǫ
)
,
where the second equality is because Pσ,τv (D <∞ | T =∞) = 1, the third equality is (2.15),
the inequality is (2.16), and the last equality is (2.14) and (2.17). Since this holds for any
ǫ, we obtain Pσ
′,τ
v (T =∞) = 0 i.e. (2.13).
Second step of the proof is to establish:
P
σ′,τ
v0
(
val(Vn) −→
n→∞
0 | hσ′(V0, . . . , Vn) −→
n→∞
0
)
= 1 . (2.18)
When playing with σ′, suppose hσ′(V0, . . . , Vn) converges to 0 then by definition of σ
′,
hσ(Vt(V0,...,Vn), . . . , Vn) converges to 0 as well. According to (2.13), t(V0, . . . , Vn) has limit
T < ∞ hence hσ(VT , . . . , Vn) converges to 0 as well. By definition of T , for every n ≥ T ,
t(V0, . . . , vn) = T , hence hσ(VT , . . . , Vn) ≥ val(Vn) −
m
2 . Since hσ(VT , . . . , Vn) converges to
0, lim supn val(Vn) ≤
m
2 . But hence val(Vn)−→n 0 because by definition of m, (val(v) <
m) =⇒ (val(v) = 0). This proves (2.18).
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We can now achieve the proof of the optimality of σ′. Since W is a tail winning
condition, Levy’s law [Dur96] implies,
P
σ′,τ
v0
(¬W ) = Pσ
′,τ
v0
(
P
σ′,τ
v0
(W | V0, . . . , Vn)−→
n
0
)
≤ Pσ
′,τ
v0
(
hσ′(V0, . . . , Vn)−→
n
0
)
≤ Pσ
′,τ
v0
(
val(Vn)−→
n
0
)
≤ Eσ
′,τ
v0
[
1− lim sup
n
val(Vn)
]
≤ 1− lim sup
n
E
σ′,τ
v0
[val(Vn)]
= 1− val(v0) ,
where the first inequality holds by definition of hσ′(v0, . . . , vn), the second is (2.18), the
third and fourth are basic properties of expectation and the last equality holds according
to lemma 2.3. This proves that σ′ is optimal in G.
2.4. Proof of Theorem 2.1. According to lemma 2.2 we can suppose without loss of
generality that G is consistent. Since both the winning condition W and its complement
V ω \ W are tail winning conditions, lemma 2.5 implies that both players have optimal
strategies in G.
Conclusion
We have proved the existence of optimal strategies in any perfect-information game with a
tail winning condition. We relied heavily on the finiteness of the game, actually the result
does not hold in general for infinite arenas. Extension of this result to certain classes of
games with partial information or with infinitely many vertices seems to be an interesting
research direction.
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